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LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY OF LANDLORD TO PERSONS ON THE PREMISES-THE "CONCEALED DEFECTS" ExcEPTION-Plaintiff sought to recover for
injuries suffered in consequence of the defective condition of a stairway in the
manufacturing plant leased by her employer from defendant. The stairway was
in the sole control of the tenant at the time of the injury; the lease stipulated
that no warranty was made as to the condition of the premises; and the sole
obligation to repair was borne by the tenant. Liability was claimed, however,
upon the contention that the stairway had been in dangerous condition at the
time of the letting. It was apparently little used, and plaintiff had used it only
once before in eight months. No claim was made that the nature of her purpose
at the time of the injury did not preclude use of one ·of the stairways customarily
used. There was no evidence that either the landlord or the tenant knew of the
condition, but what.ever danger existed was apparently entirely patent. On appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee,
held, judgment directing a verdict in favor of the landlord reversed. Liability
can be predicated on grounds of negligence when premises are let in an unsafe
and dangerous condition, if the lessor knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. An employee of the tenant stands in the position of a third
person whose right to recovery is not barred by any contract between his employer and the landlord. Kaylor v. Magill, (6th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 179.
Although the lessor is generally said to make no warranty as to the condition
of the premises demised and therefore to bear no liability to the tenant or to
another standing in his right for an injury resulting from a dangerous condition
thereon,1 all of the courts recognize, inter alia, an exception to this rule in the
case of such a condition the existence of which the lessor concealed from the
tenant at the time of the letting. As this exception is most generally stated, there
is imposed on the landlord the obligation to disclose to his prospective tenant the
existence of a condition of which he is cognizant and which he knows to be
dangerous, if he can anticipate that the tenant will not discover its existence in
the usual course of occupation.2 As to the logical basis for the imposition of this
obligation, the courts are not in agreement: some see it to be in the nature of
fraud when the lessor conceals such a condition from the tenant; 3 others see it
1 Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B. (n.s.) 221 (1863); Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass.
363, 1 Am. St. Rep. 469 (1887); Akerley v. White, 58 Hun. 362, 12 N.Y.S. 149 (1890);
McKenzie v. Cheetham, 83 Me. 543, 22 A. 469 (1891); Fraser v. Kr_uger, (8th Cir.
1924) 298 F. 693; Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937);
1 TIFF.ANY, LANDLORD .AND TENANT §§ 86a, 96a (1912); PROSSER, ToRTS § 81 (1941);
ToRTS RESTATEMENT §356 (1934); Harkrider, "Tort Liability of a Landlord,'' 26 MicH.
L. REv. 260 and 383 (1928); Eldredge, "Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair," 84
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 467 (1936); 49 MicH. L. REv. 449 (1951); cases collected in 34
L.R.A. 609, 824 (1897), 34 L.R.A. (n.s.) 798 (1911), 50 L.R.A. (n.s.) 286 (1914).
2 Cowen v. Sunderland, supra note l; McKenzie v. Cheetham, supra note I; Fraser
v. Kruger, supra note 1; 1 TIFF.ANY, LANDLORD .AND TENANT § 86d (1912); PROSSER,
TORTS § 81a (1941); Harkrider, "Tort Liability of a Landlord,'' 26 MicH. L. REv. 260
at 264 (1928).
3 Akerley v. White, supra note l; Fraser v. Kruger, supra note l; Brown v. Webster
Realty Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 587, 146 A. 671 (1929); O'Neil v. Brown, 158 Ky. 118, 164
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instead to be negligence; 4 a few cases seem to confuse this matter with the
incipient nuisance idea, categorizing as "third persons" some persons usually
thought to stand in the right of the tenant, for the purpose of application of the
idea.5 Since the landlord can be held liable only for injuries of which his breach
of the obligation was proximate cause, the application of the "concealed defect"
exception is limited to those cases where the tenant had no actual knowledge
of the dangerous condition.6 A good many cases make some reference to "constructive knowledge" on the part of the landlord as satisfying the requirement
that he know of a defect in order to be under an obligation to disclose its existence to his tenant; 7 it is seldom, however, that the courts responsible for the reference mean other than that the landlord, while not actually knowing of a dangerous condition, possesses such information as· would lead a reasonable man to
suspect the existence of one. The language of the Tennessee cases, however,
going back to the holding in the Willcox cases,8 would seem to put upon the
S.W. 315 (1914); Morgan v. Sheppard, 156 Ala. 403, 47 S. 147 (1908); PROSSER, ToRTS
§ 81a (1941).
4 Honan v. Kinney, 205 Minn. 485, 286 N.W. 404 (1939); 1 Tll'I'ANY, LANDLORD
TENANT § 86d (1912). Tiffany sees basing liability on fraud as requiring an illogical
limitation on the class of persons whose rights can be derived therefrom, § 96b.
5 Deutsch v. Max, 318 Pa. 450, 178 A. 481 (1935), overruled in Harris v. Lewistown
Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 34 (1937); Reichenbacher v. Pahmeyer, 8 ID. App. 217
(1881), impliedly overruled in Soibel v. Oconto Co., 299 ID. App. 518, 20 N.E. (2d)
309 (1939).
The practically uniform holding today is that the tenant's employee or guest, or another
entering under his title, has no greater right than the tenant himself with respect to injury
due to dangerous conditions on the premises. Soibel v. Oconto Co., supra; Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., supra; Fraser v. Kruger, supra note 1. It is probable that there is no room
left for application of a nuisance theory for the benefit of persons on the premises. Harris
v. Lewistown Trust Co. supra. Cf. Morgan v. Sheppard, supra note 3. See cases collected
at 110 A.L.R. 756 (1937).
6 Newman v. Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 144 A. 467 (1929); Moynihan v. Allyn, 162
Mass. 270, 38 N.E. 497 (1894); Akerley v. White, supra note 1; Harrill v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E. (2d) 240 (1945); Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co.,
supra note l.
7 Elijah A. Brown Co. v. Wilson, 191 Ga. 751, 13 S.E. (2d) 779 (1941); Dennis v.
Rockefeller Center, 270 App. Div. 524, 60 N.Y.S. (2d) 515 (1946); Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W. (2d) 719 (1949).
8 Lucy Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 328, 33 S.W. 914, 34 S.W. 420 (1896);
Stenberg v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 163, 328, 33 S.W. 917, 34 S.W. 420 (1896); Willcox
v. Lillie Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 45 S.W. 781 (1898); (on second appeal) Willcox v.
Lucy Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898). The cases involved claims against a
landlord for injuries consequent to the collapse of a second story porch which was a part
of the demised premises, brought respectively by the tenant, a boarder, and a child of the
tenant. Possibly the landlord could have been held liable upon traditional grounds of
misfeasance, for there was evidence presented that a carpenter had made repairs to the
porch on the landlord's order, following complaint by the tenant, but negligently failed
to discover the principal structural defects, and had told the tenant, "The porch is all safe
now.'' Willcox v. Lillie Hines, 100 Tenn. 524 at 530.
The Stenberg case is often cited as extending the "public use" exception to the case
of a boarding house, and there is language therein to support this. See Eldredge, ''Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair," 84 Umv. PA. L. REv. 467 at 489 (1936); 49 MrcH.
L. REv. 449 (1951).
AND
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landlord the additional obligation to inspect the premises before leasing them.,
and to charge him with liability on account of not only those defects of which
he had some knowledge or suspicion but also those which he could have found
by making a "reasonable inspection."9 This liability is seen to rest on a negligence theory.10 The approach has been widely criticized,11 though largely because of its inconsistency with an analysis of the "concealed defect" exception on
a fraud theory.12 In accord with the usual limitation, 13 the Tennessee court will
not hold a landlord liable for an injury caused by a defect of which the tenant
had actual knowledge,14 nor of which he could have become aware. 15 The in9 The same rule, now codified, was adopted by decision by the Louisiana court.
Lasyone v. Zenoria Lumber Co., 163 La. 185, Ill S. 670 (1927). It has also been so
held by other courts, on the foundation of a statute placing the obligation to repair
dwelling houses on the fee owner, whether in possession or not. See cases collected at
93 A.L.R. 783 (1934); 101 A.L.R. 408 (1936); 132 A.L.R. 865 (1941); Harkrider,
"Tort Liability of a Landlord," 26 M:rcH. L. REv. 260 and 383 at 383 (1928).
There is basis for Tiffany's contention that the Tennessee court would limit the
application of the Willcox approach to those cases where all courts would hold the landlord
liable for having failed to disclose facts which would reasonably lead him to suspect the
existence of a concealed defect. I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 86d (1912). In
Edington v. Kreis-Keener Shoe Co., 153 Tenn. 323, 283 S.W. 987 (1926), a tenant
was held to have failed to show that the landlord by a reasonable inspection could have
discovered the improper construction of a ceiling which would tend to be dangerously
weakened by a leak in the roof overhead. In Bishop v. Botto, 16 Tenn. App. 178, 65
S.W. (2d) 834 (1932) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme Court), a landlord was not
charged with knowledge of the existence of a capped cistern which exploded, although it
was only a few inches beneath the soil under the house. In Diamond v. Drew, 17 Tenn.
App. 488, 68 S.W. (2d) 955 (1933) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme Court), no
recovery on the Willcox theory was allowed a tenant injured by the collapse of a platform
from the failure of its supporting sleeper, although the sleeper was assumed to have been
in a state of dangerous decay at the time of the letting, because the landlord had no
reason to suspect the existence of such a condition. No Tennessee cases, with the possible
exception of the Willcox cases themselves, found liability of a landlord solely on failure to
inspect portions of the premises not remaining under his control.
10 Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 328 at 332, 33 S.W. 914 (1896).
11 "Hines v. Willcox is a new departure in the law of landlord and tenant." Comment
of annotator, 34 L.R.A. 824 (1896). "The views expressed in Willcox v. Hines •.. do not
command our assent." Holmes, J., in O'Malley v. Twenty-Five Associates, 178 Mass.
555 at 559, 60 N.E. 387 (1901). PROSSER, TORTS §Sla (1941); Harkrider, "Tort
Liability of a Landlord," 26 MrcH. L. REv. 260 at 266-7 (1928), and cases there cited.
12 Fraser v. Kruger, (8th Cir. 1924) 298 F. 693.
13 Cases cited in note 6 supra.
14 Gary v. Spitler, IO Tenn. App. 34 (1929) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme
Court); Hamilton v. Moore, 14 Tenn. App. 584 (1932) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme
Court); Haire v. American Trust and Banking Co., 19 Tenn. App. 656, 94 S.W. (2d)
59 (1935) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme Court); Louden v. Cline, 8 Tenn. C.C.A.
· (Higgins) 272 (1918) (cert. den. by Tennessee Supreme Court). Indeed, rather than
being more ready than most courts to impose liability on a landlord, perhaps the Tennessee
court is quite the contrary, in view of its decision in Manes v. Hines and McNair Hotels,
184 Tenn. 210, 197 S.W. (2d) 889 (1946). There a landlord was held blameless to his
tenant for her fall upon a part of the floor of a common corridor. xnade slippery by a
radiator leak and by the landlord's application of oil to preserve the floor from decay.
The court stated that since the tenant knew of the slippery_ condition, she could have
walked around it. And in Hamilton v. Moore, supra, recovery was denied a tenant
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stant holding purports to be made solely within the "concealed defect" exception
and to follow the Willcox approach thereto. It would seem, however, to be in
conllict not only with the great majority of the decisions relating to this exception, but also with the most liberal application which could be made of the
Willcox rule itself. It cannot be admitted that the employee of the tenant should
have any greater rights than the tenant himself,16 nor that a landlord should bear
any obligation or liability on account of an entirely patent defect in a part of
the premises within the tenant's sole control.17
Robert S. Griggs

injured by the collapse of a stairway, despite a covenant by the landlord to repair; it was
held that since she knew of the danger and could have moved out, she assumed the risk
of injury by remaining in possession of the premises.
15 No merit was seen, however, in the landlord's contention on appeal that the lower
court erred in excluding evidence that other persons in the Hines household considered
the porch manifestly unsound even after the repairs to it. Willcox v. Lillie Hines, 100
Tenn. 524 at 535.
16 Haire v. American Trust and Banking Co., supra note 14. See cases cited in
note 5 supra.
17 Furthermore, the holding in Manes v. Hines and McNair Hotels, q.v., supra note
14, would seem to bar this plaintiff from recovery on grounds of assumption of risk or
contributory negligence, she having used the unsafe stairway when other, safe ones were
available.

